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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the Internet has brought with it a fundamental change in the 
way nations and their citizens engage in global economic activity, manage 
critical infrastructure, and communicate with one another.  Although the 
Internet is ubiquitous in modern society and plays a critical role in many 
aspects of everyday life, it was never intended to be used by so many and for 
the vast number of functions it performs today.  To the contrary, the Internet 
was designed to allow a small group of scientists to share unclassified 
reports; it was not designed to transfer sensitive information securely.1  
Moreover, the Internet was not designed to allow for easy monitoring of user 
behavior and was not designed to protect against attacks originating from 
within the Internet itself.2  That same inherent design persists today, largely 
unchanged, while the Internet’s uses have evolved drastically.3  The ease and 
anonymity with which people throughout the world can access information 
systems via the Internet, coupled with the Internet’s inherently flawed 
design, have created a vulnerability to cyberattacks on an unprecedented 
scale.4  Targets of cyberattacks are diverse, and the costs of such attacks are 
necessarily borne by consumers, private industry, and governments alike.5  
The frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks are likely to increase, as 
instructions for sophisticated attack methods are made more widely available 
to would-be attackers via the Internet, reducing the technical knowledge 
required to carry out an attack.6     
All the same, the Internet has become vital in carrying out basic economic 
and governmental functions, including management of infrastructure7 and the 
international financial network.8  Cyberattacks pose a greater risk to 
                                                                                                                   
 1 HOWARD F. LIPSON, CARNEGIE MELLON SOFTWARE ENG’G INST., TRACKING AND TRACING 
CYBER-ATTACKS: TECHNICAL CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES 13 (2002). 
 2 Id. at 13–14. 
 3 See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against 
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
57, 67–69 (2010) (describing the Internet’s historical purpose and the exponential increase in 
the types of devices with Internet access over the past two decades). 
 4 See id. at 73–87 (describing threats the Internet poses to national and international 
security).  
 5 See, e.g., id. at 84–85 (noting the security threat the Internet poses to the international 
financial system and that a cyberattack on even one large U.S. bank would have a greater 
global economic impact than the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001). 
 6 See LIPSON, supra note 1, at 9–10 (noting the declining average technical knowledge of 
attackers versus the increasing sophistication of attacks over time).  
 7 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Past, Present, and Future of Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 13, 14–15 (2010).  
 8 Gable, supra note 3, at 76–77.  
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developed nations, where virtually all governmental operations require the 
support of computer systems.9  That is not to say that lesser-wired nations 
will be shielded from collateral impact; with the convergence of today’s 
commercial systems, a coordinated cyberattack against stock markets and 
banks could erode consumer confidence and effectively create a global 
financial crisis.10   
The international community has a clear interest in developing a 
comprehensive, multilateral cybersecurity framework because the 
widespread use of the Internet in every aspect of daily life has created an 
almost “irreversible dependence” on its technological benefits,11 and because 
the conceptual underpinnings of existing legal frameworks are not readily 
adaptable to threats emerging in cyberspace.12  Many developed countries 
have taken steps toward developing comprehensive cybersecurity policy; 
however, these governments acknowledge that unilateral action will not 
suffice.13  A recent U.S. government review of cybersecurity policy 
recognized the need for “ ‘a strategy for cybersecurity designed to shape the 
international environment and bring like-minded nations together on a host 
of issues, such as technical standards and acceptable legal norms regarding 
territorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility, and the use of force.’ ”14  
International cooperation is essential because the most devastating 
cyberattacks are often carried out using multiple computers simultaneously 
from around the globe, hampering the aggrieved nation’s ability to pursue 
justice unilaterally as a result of jurisdictional issues.15  Despite the fact that 
many attacks are carried out across multiple jurisdictions and often originate 
in foreign countries,16 current international law does not recognize nations as 
duty bound to assist in investigating a cyberattack that allegedly originated 
within their jurisdiction.17  As a result, nations attempting to develop and 
                                                                                                                   
 9 See, e.g., id. at 77–78 (describing the dependence of the U.S. government on the Internet). 
 10 Id. at 84. 
 11 Id. at 64.  
 12 See SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS 6–7 (2009) (positing that cyberwarfare, 
cyberterrorism, and cybercrime differ from analogous activity in the physical world in a way 
that challenges the conceptual underpinnings of applicable legal regimes).  
 13 See, e.g., Jeffrey Hunker, U.S. International Policy for Cybersecurity: Five Issues That 
Won’t Go Away, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 197, 197 (2010) (noting the U.S. 
government’s view of cybersecurity as a global issue calling for international cooperation). 
 14 Gable, supra note 3, at 89 (quoting EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE, at iv (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.govass 
ets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf). 
 15 Id. at 101.  
 16 Id. 
 17 Christopher E. Lentz, Comment, A State’s Duty to Prevent and Respond to 
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enforce cybersecurity measures often lack international support from nations 
where a given cyberattack likely originated.18  Even when a victimized 
nation does receive cooperation from a foreign nation under, for example, a 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), evidentiary requests often take 
several months to be honored, if at all.19  Since evidence of a cyberattack 
may be disposed of quickly, current international agreements like MLATs 
providing for law-enforcement cooperation operate too slowly to be 
effective.20      
In the absence of codified law, nations attempting to enforce their 
cybersecurity regimes against foreign perpetrators have done so largely by 
analogy to international law governing military use of force and domestic 
criminal law.21  Existing international cybersecurity agreements are narrow 
in scope, focusing on criminal activity in cyberspace, and fail to adequately 
account for cyberspace as a platform for terrorism and military action.22   
The shortcomings of existing international law were apparent during the 
cyberattack perpetrated against Estonia in 2007.  The attack on Estonia 
represents the best-known example of a coordinated cyberattack on a 
sovereign nation’s critical infrastructure, and it illustrates the need for an 
international effort to coordinate cybersecurity policy.23  The attack was 
debilitating, disrupting government communication support systems, and the 
online platforms of banks, retailers, and newspapers.24  The damage inflicted 
by the attack necessitated a response from the Estonian government; 
however, the government could do very little in the absence of established 
procedures for international cooperation because the attacks originated in 
foreign jurisdictions.25  The attack demonstrated that the Internet is a viable 
alternative to traditional modes of warfare and terrorism.  It also reaffirmed 
                                                                                                                   
Cyberterrorist Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 799, 800 (2010).  
 18 See Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A 
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 
201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting several major states’ refusal to participate in international 
efforts to curb cyberattacks and a belief among security experts that China and Russia sponsor 
such attacks to varying degrees). 
 19 LIPSON, supra note 1, at 51 n.48. 
 20 Id. at 51 & n.48. 
 21 Sklerov, supra note 18, at 6.  
 22 See id. at 5–10 (noting the prevailing view under international law that states must treat 
international cyberattacks as a criminal matter because of the constraints imposed by existing 
international law governing war).  
 23 Scott J. Shackelford, Estonia Three Years Later: A Progress Report on Combating Cyber 
Attacks, J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2010, at 22, 22.  
 24 Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21 
2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ffestonia?currentPage=all. 
 25 Sklerov, supra note 18, at 5, 8. 
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that the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework with the 
flexibility to cope with the complex nature of cyberspace has hampered 
efforts to deter such acts and prosecute those responsible.26  
To prepare for and deter similar future attacks, the international 
community should use existing international legal instruments and principles 
as guidance in developing a comprehensive legal framework to combat 
cyberaggression.  One such instrument is the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),27 which, among other things, addresses the 
duty of sovereign states to combat piracy outside its jurisdiction, including in 
international waters.28  Because UNCLOS governs legal relationships 
relating to the sea—which, like the Internet, transcends legal regimes based 
on traditional notions of territorial jurisdiction—UNLCOS’s treatment of 
piracy and the obligations it imposes on states provide meaningful guidance 
in developing international obligations related to cybersecurity. 
This Note calls for the development of an international legal framework 
addressing cybersecurity based on UNCLOS and the duties and obligations it 
imposes to combat piracy.  Part II discusses the history of the Internet, the 
nature of weapons used in cyberattacks, recent examples of a cyberattack’s 
destructive potential, and the legal challenges posed by cyberattacks.  Part III 
discusses the status of the international community’s efforts to formulate a 
response to the threat of cyberaggression, addresses the legal challenges 
posed by attempting to categorize a given cyberattack under existing legal 
definitions, and highlights legal challenges faced by nations attempting to 
operate within the limits of existing law, including domestic and 
international criminal law regimes and the law of war.  Part IV identifies the 
similarities between the nature of piracy and cyberaggression, discusses the 
problems raised by the international community’s ongoing efforts to combat 
piracy by way of international law, and advocates for the use of UNCLOS 
and its treatment of piracy as a viable blueprint for imposing international 
obligations to combat cyberaggression.  
                                                                                                                   
 26 See id. at 6–7 (noting the absence of a comprehensive international treaty addressing 
cybersecurity and discussing the resulting legal challenges that arise in situations like the 
Estonia attack). 
 27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 28 Id. art. 100. 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE SPECTER OF CYBERAGGRESSION AND RECENT 
ATTACKS 
As the frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks continue to increase, 
cybersecurity has become one of the most pressing issues facing the 
international community and the modern state.29  Additionally, as nations 
attempt to respond to these attacks, “the variable levels of malicious cyber 
activity” further aggravate the problem of determining an appropriate 
response.30  Recent incidents demonstrate the diverse nature of cyberattacks 
and the international community’s lack of an effective approach to incident 
deterrence and response.31  These attacks also underscore the challenge of 
identifying the nature of a given attack and the parties responsible for the 
attack, and of developing a legal framework flexible enough to effectively 
counter the unique circumstances of a given cyberattack.  The origin of the 
threat posed by cyberspace is found in the architecture of the Internet itself.  
A.  A Brief History of the Internet 
The reasons for the creation and development of the Internet provide 
essential background for understanding the complex legal and technological 
challenges of combating cyberattacks.  Originally known as ARPANET, the 
Internet was first developed in the 1960s by the Pentagon to create a system 
of interconnected computers for national security purposes.32  In the mid-
1980s, a common method of network communication known as TCP/IP 
Protocol was adopted as the Internet’s standard for data transfers between 
computers,33 and it was later used by the National Science Foundation to 
                                                                                                                   
 29 See Gable, supra note 3, at 60 (arguing that the Internet has exponentially increased the 
threat terrorism poses to international security and has become one the greatest threats to the 
security of the modern state); see also Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: 
Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 194–95 (2009) 
(noting the potential of a sophisticated, professionally coordinated cyberattack to destroy or 
damage much of a nation’s infrastructure with effects similar to an electromagnetic pulse from 
a nuclear weapon). 
 30 Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare and the Crime of Aggression: The Need for 
Individual Accountability on Tomorrow’s Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 003, ¶ 7 
(2010). 
 31 Sklerov, supra note 18, at 4–7 (noting attacks on Georgia, the United States, and Estonia 
and the challenges faced by each nation in responding under existing international legal 
frameworks). 
 32 Gable, supra note 3, at 67–68.  
 33 LIPSON, supra note 1, at 5 n.4 (“A network protocol is a common language for 
communicating across a network. The protocol specifies the rules for data format and 
transmission.” (emphasis omitted)).    
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establish connections between universities throughout the United States.34  
TCP/IP remains the foundation for network communications on today’s 
Internet.35 
Initially, the Internet was only accessible to governmental divisions, and 
their computers were presumed secure simply by virtue of their access to the 
network.36  Since all Internet users at the time were known and trusted, 
TCP/IP Protocol’s only goal was to facilitate communication, resulting in an 
insecure framework.37  The National Science Foundation began to connect 
other countries to the Internet in 1988, and transferred control of the Internet 
to private entities in 1995.38  Initially, the Internet was only accessible 
through mainframe and desktop computers, the locations of which were 
static and readily traceable, unlike the wide array of wireless devices that are 
used to access the Internet today.39  As the Internet developed, many 
separate, smaller networks based on the same fundamental structure 
developed independently.  The smaller networks were (and continue to be) 
used by corporations, banks, federal reserves, and many other organizations 
to transfer money and conduct business.40   
Today’s Internet is a network of networks, “comprised of a myriad of 
host computer systems joined together by communications links (wired and 
wireless).”41  These host computer systems communicate with one another 
using TCP/IP network protocol, which dictates the format and method of 
transfer of data.42  Computers use routers to transfer TCP/IP formatted data 
over the Internet.43  These routers operate by identifying data’s destination 
addresses and transferring that data to another router closer on the network to 
its destination until it reaches its destination.44  The system of routers ensures 
that there are multiple paths data can take to reach its destination, which 
allows the system to continue to function in the event that communication 
links or routers are out of service.45  The network of routers is not discerning; 
it transfers information from its origin to its destination but lacks the ability, 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Gable, supra note 3, at 68.  
 35 LIPSON, supra note 1, at 5. 
 36 Gable, supra note 3, at 78. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 68–69. 
 39 Id. at 69. 
 40 Id. 
 41 LIPSON, supra note 1, at 7. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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by virtue of its design, to ascertain the content of the data being transferred.46  
The routing system’s structure was intended to ensure the Internet’s 
continuing functionality in the event of an external attack, but it was not 
designed to prevent damage caused by the very data that it transfers.47  The 
lack of focus on the security risks during the Internet’s development, the 
exponential growth of Internet accessibility since its inception, and the 
existence of numerous parallel networks used by vital industries such as the 
financial sector are a large part of the challenges posed by modern 
cyberattacks.  
B.  The Mechanics of a Cyberattack 
The Internet’s basic structure, the growing availability of Internet access, 
and decreasing access costs have resulted in essentially anonymous global 
access, which increasingly facilitates the availability,  “assembly and use of 
cyber weaponry on a global scale.”48  Moreover, individual Internet use is 
difficult to trace because the original Internet was designed to facilitate 
information flow and collaboration as opposed to commercial and 
government purposes.49  As a consequence, Internet Service Providers track 
Internet access based on overall usage, which does not involve monitoring 
the type of content sent or received by their customers.50  Thus, 
cyberattackers can operate free from close scrutiny of their Internet use and 
behavior.51   
Generally, cyberattacks are separated into three major categories: (1) 
“automated malicious software delivered over the Internet,” (2) “denial-of-
service[ ] attacks,” and (3) “unauthorized remote intrusions into computer 
systems.”52  Recent high profile attacks perpetrated against Estonia, Georgia, 
and Iran53 have involved a combination of these attack methods, but two 
types of attack are of particular importance because they are relatively easy 
to carry out and they are extremely effective.  The first type utilizes malware, 
                                                                                                                   
 46 Sharon R. Stevens, Internet War Crimes Tribunals and Security in an Interconnected 
World, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 657, 660 (2009). 
 47 LIPSON, supra note 1, at 14. 
 48 Ophardt, supra note 30, ¶ 21. 
 49 Stevens, supra note 46, at 660–61. 
 50 LIPSON, supra note 1, at 13. 
 51 See id. at 14–16 (explaining that advanced users can easily modify the content of 
information sent from an apparently trustworthy source or forge a source address, 
circumventing the Internet’s only filtering mechanism).  
 52 Sklerov, supra note 18, at 13–14.   
 53 See infra Part II.C (describing these attacks). 
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which was traditionally classified as either a virus or worm.54  Malware 
typically infects a computer system through e-mail or when a user visits 
infected websites, and the nature of its interaction with the system depends 
on whether it operates like a virus or worm.55  For example, a virus cannot 
replicate itself until a user runs the infected program and can lay dormant 
until that occurs.56  When it does, the virus replicates itself, infiltrates other 
programs on the host computer, and modifies them to carry out functions 
other than those originally intended.57  Worms, on the other hand, are 
themselves programs and can replicate independently.58  Worms can spread 
within a host computer system and also to any system connected to it by a 
network or the Internet.59  As malware has grown more sophisticated it has 
been further classified by its specific function, common examples of which 
are “Trojan horses, rootkits, sniffers, exploits, bombs, and zombies.”60 Many 
cyberattacks involve another form of malware that allows multiple 
computers to be remotely controlled by—or “slaved” to the commands of—a 
single operator who can dictate the behavior of those computers.61  
Cyberattackers can effectively magnify the potential devastation caused by 
an attack by using this slaving technique.62  This method of attack, used in 
the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia, “allow[s] a cyberattacker to implement a 
coordinated attack from numerous locations, including within the target 
network, with very limited warning for a nominal cost.”63   
The second frequently used method of cyberattack is known as a denial-
of-service (DOS) attack.64  A DOS attack is initiated from a single computer 
and overwhelms a target computer system with requests until the system can 
no longer function properly, denying users access to and use of the targeted 
system.65  A DOS attack operates by paralyzing the target system’s 
functionality, while malware operates by changing the function the target 
system is programmed to perform.  Both methods capitalize on basic flaws in 
                                                                                                                   
 54 Symantec, the maker of popular Norton antivirus software, defines malware as “a 
category of malicious code that includes viruses [and] worms. . . . [which] utilize popular 
communication tools to spread.”  Malware, NORTON, http://us.norton.com/security_response/ 
malware.jsp (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).  
 55 Sklerov, supra note 18, at 14–15. 
 56 Id. at 15. 
 57 Id. at 14–15. 
 58 Id. at 15. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. 
 61 Ophardt, supra note 30, ¶ 20. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. ¶ 21. 
 64 Sklerov, supra note 18, at 14. 
 65 Id. at 16. 
256 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:247 
the Internet’s architecture and are often used in conjunction with one another 
to maximize damage to the target system.66  The recent cyberattacks on 
Estonia and Georgia offer vivid examples, as they were carried out using a 
combination of malware and DOS known as a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDOS).67   
In a DDOS attack, hackers use malware to take control of numerous 
computers and use the hijacked computers—referred to as “zombies”—to 
send a massive series of data packets to the targeted networks.68  It is 
particularly difficult to track a DDOS attack to its original source because the 
owners of the hijacked computers are rarely aware that their systems are 
being used remotely to carry out a cyberattack.69  A network of compromised 
“zombie” computers is often referred to as a “botnet.”70  In 2007, Vint Cerf, 
widely recognized as one of the fathers of the Internet, estimated that as 
many as 25% of networked computers worldwide, or 150 million computers, 
may be part of botnets.71  Although hackers use other methods in carrying 
out attacks, malware, DOS, and DDOS used in recent, high profile attacks 
demonstrates the urgency of addressing cyberattacks and the challenges they 
pose for victimized nations. 
C.  The Cyberattacks on Estonia, Georgia, and Iran 
In 2007, Estonian public and private sectors suffered a prolonged 
cyberattack campaign that lasted several weeks.72  Estonia, formerly under 
the control of the USSR, decided to remove a Soviet statue built to 
commemorate victory over Nazi Germany from the town of Tallinn.73  The 
decision sparked protests from ethnic Russians living in Estonia, and even 
angered Russian government-funded groups outside of Estonia.74  Within 
days of the statue’s removal, a coordinated cyberattack began.75  The attack, 
which occurred in waves over several weeks, “disrupt[ed] the websites of the 
Estonian President and Parliament, the vast majority of Estonian ministries, 
                                                                                                                   
 66 See Gable, supra note 3, at 78–80 (arguing that the Internet’s use of TCP/IP Protocol is 
responsible for its vulnerability to cyberattacks). 
 67 BRENNER, supra note 12, at 1.  
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Tim Weber, Criminals ‘May Overwhelm the Web,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2007), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6298641.stm. 
 72 Shackelford, supra note 29, at 202–03. 
 73 Id. at 205 & n.67. 
 74 Id. at 205–06. 
 75 Davis, supra note 24.  
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three of the country’s six largest news organizations, and two of its major 
banks.”76  The crippling impact of the attack was due, in part, to the fact that 
the Estonian government conducts most of its basic operations using the 
Internet.77  The prolonged disruption of critical websites caused widespread 
unrest and rioting; 150 people were injured and one Russian national was 
killed.78  Although the attacks originated within Russian jurisdiction, Estonia 
was never able to link them directly to the Russian government.79  However, 
the impression that Russia was behind the attacks during the ensuing chaos 
led some Estonian officials to advocate for an official request for assistance 
pursuant to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty,80 which requires members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to assist an ally in the 
event of an armed attack.81  Article V expressly states that such assistance 
may include use of “armed force” against the aggressor.82  This marked the 
first time in NATO history that a member state sought assistance from 
NATO allies in response to an Internet-based attack on its infrastructure.83 
Although the Estonian government claims to have proof that the earliest 
attacks originated from Russian government computers, the nature of a 
DDOS attack makes determining the original source of the attack difficult.84  
Moreover, hackers who use botnets continue to develop increasingly 
sophisticated command structures that make the task of tracing an attack to 
the original source nearly impossible.85  One development is the use of tiered 
command and control, which allows users of botnets to distribute functions 
“across many different, geographically dispersed computer servers [unlike] 
earlier versions, which had a single point of command.”86  It is evident, 
though, that unaffiliated individuals “who were goaded into attacking 
Estonian websites in Russian-language chat rooms” were responsible for at 
least part of the attacks.87  Their estimated involvement in the attack, 
however, is only a fraction of the estimated one million zombie computers 
used to overload Estonian websites and governmental systems.88  A 
                                                                                                                   
 76 Gable, supra note 3, at 61. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Shackelford, supra note 29, at 194. 
 79 Sklerov, supra note 18, at 8. 
 80 Shackelford, supra note 29, at 194. 
 81 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Shackelford, supra note 23, at 25. 
 84 BRENNER, supra note 12, at 1. 
 85 Id. at 2.  
 86 Id. 
 87 Shackelford, supra note 29, at 207. 
 88 BRENNER, supra note 12, at 2. 
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subsequent U.S. government investigation found that it is not likely that 
Russian security agencies were responsible for the attacks, but rather 
politically driven hackers89  Although there is no indisputable evidence 
implicating the Russian government’s direct involvement in the attack, it 
coincided with a political dispute between Estonia and Russia, and several 
Estonian websites were replaced with Russian propaganda.90   
It is clear, however, that a number of Russian computers were used in the 
attack, but Russia has refused to assist Estonia’s criminal investigation 
despite Estonia’s request for assistance.91  Russia’s refusal to cooperate only 
compounds Estonia’s already difficult task of identifying and prosecuting the 
responsible parties, is representative of the unique jurisdictional obstacles 
posed by cyberattacks, and illustrates the pressing need for an international 
framework that facilitates, or even mandates, cooperation.  Without Russian 
cooperation, which is not required by existing international law,92 Estonia’s 
criminal investigations have been, for the most part, unsuccessful.93 
While political upheaval predated the cyberattack on Estonia, a 
cyberattack against Georgia in 2008 immediately preceded Georgia’s armed 
conflict with Russia over the disputed territory of South Ossetia.94  The 
attack was designed to disrupt the Georgian government’s ability to 
communicate, demonstrating that a cyberattack can complement traditional 
armed conflict.95  The DDOS attack on Georgia began weeks before the 
armed conflict, and it “overloaded and effectively shut down Georgian 
servers.”96  A DDOS attack can be enormously effective in disrupting an 
enemy’s ability to coordinate defense measures in preparing for an armed 
conflict, transmit emergency communications to its citizens, and 
communicate with the outside world.97  The attack on Georgia is an example 
of the crucial role that cyberattacks may play in future instances of armed 
conflict.  Cyberattacks are a cost effective alternative or complement to 
traditional warfare, as the cost of initiating a cyberattack relative to 
developing, producing, and using traditional weaponry is nominal.  If states 
can “ ‘fund an entire cyberwarfare campaign for the cost of replacing a tank 
                                                                                                                   
 89 Shackelford, supra note 29, at 208. 
 90 Id. at 205–06. 
 91 Id. at 204, 208. 
 92 Lentz, supra note 17, at 800. 
 93 See Shackelford, supra note 29, at 208 (noting that only one conviction has resulted from 
the attack). 
 94 John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at A1.  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. 
 97 See, e.g., Ophardt, supra note 30, ¶ 6 (describing the impact of DDOS during the attack 
on Georgia).  
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tread,’ ”98 it is likely to gain favor as a viable complement or alternative to 
traditional warfare. 
The source of the cyberattack on Georgia, as with Estonia, is still the 
subject of debate.99  Evidence suggests that a Russian criminal organization 
was responsible for the attack with the support of the Russian government, 
but the difficulty in sorting through an attack perpetrated using numerous 
computers throughout the world makes it impossible to be certain.100  The 
lack of consensus on who initiated the attack underscores the challenge of 
determining who should ultimately be held responsible for initiating a 
cyberattack.   
Cyberattacks, however, do not always result in noticeable interference 
with the targeted computer system.  In 2010, Iranian officials discovered 
malicious software, known as Stuxnet, with the ability to reprogram a host 
computer system, on networks used to manage their industrial infrastructure, 
including their much-maligned nuclear facilities.101  While the cyberattacks 
perpetrated against Estonia and Georgia disrupted the targeted operating 
systems, Stuxnet was ostensibly introduced into Iran’s critical infrastructure 
systems to assess the Iranian nuclear threat and destroy the facility if 
necessary.102  Iranian officials believe it had been operating in Iran’s 
computer systems for almost a year before discovery, and it also proved 
difficult to remove from the system, copying itself into several versions to 
evade removal.103  Unlike the attacks on Estonia and Georgia, Stuxnet was 
introduced to a computer’s operating system using a USB port, illustrating 
that even systems that are not connected to the Internet are vulnerable to 
exploitation.104  While Stuxnet did not take control of the nuclear facility, 
which it was more than capable of doing, the damage it caused delayed the 
facility’s opening by several months.105  Stuxnet has also been found in other 
infrastructure systems in India, Pakistan, and Indonesia raising concerns that 
once sophisticated malware is released into a network, it can spread 
unpredictably and fall into even more dangerous hands.106  Clearly, the 
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prospect of an unknown party gaining control of a nation’s nuclear facility 
by way of a cyberattack reinforces the gravity of the threat posed by 
cyberaggression.  If a hostile nation were able to seize control of a nuclear 
facility in this manner, a threatened nation would find it difficult to justify 
retaliation by force under existing international law.107    
Although the cyberattack on Iran was not carried out using the Internet 
like the cyberattacks on Estonia and Georgia, in all cases, the victimized 
nations were unable to attribute responsibility for the attack.  Each example 
demonstrates the inherent difficulty of determining responsibility for a 
cyberattack, the nature of the attack, and the intentions of those 
responsible.108  For example, the Estonia attack, which originally appeared to 
be a state-sponsored cyberattack by Russia, was relatively unsophisticated 
and well within the capabilities of mere civilians.109  Such ambiguity 
surrounding the perpetrators and their intentions is a significant obstacle to 
any victimized nation’s ability to defend itself, and current legal regimes do 
little to address the problem.110  The problem, at its core, is evidentiary; a 
nation under attack must properly attribute the attack before choosing a 
course of action but rarely has immediate access to the necessary evidence, 
which is often in a foreign jurisdiction and can be destroyed quickly and 
easily.111  Gathering evidence of an attack, which is ephemeral by nature, is 
further hampered by cross-border law enforcement’s reliance on 
international agreements that were not designed with the unique problems of 
cyberaggression in mind.112 
III.  EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW ADDRESSING CYBERSECURITY 
As previously stated, no comprehensive international legal framework 
addressing cybersecurity exists.113  International efforts to address the issue 
have been narrow in scope, focusing primarily on data privacy regulations 
and human rights,114 at the expense of a broader effort to define and 
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differentiate various levels of cyberaggression and codify an international 
approach to deal with its challenges.115  These shortcomings may be due, in 
part, to the nature of cyberaggression, which “challenge[s] the conceptual 
categories we have so far used to avoid chaos and maintain order in our 
societies and in our lives.”116  Without a comprehensive international 
definition of the types of cyberaggression, nations will continue to face 
challenges in assessing the legality of their response to a given attack.117  
Finally, because there is no international body authorized to investigate and 
prosecute cyberaggression without limitation based upon the attack’s 
location, nations resort to legal systems founded on the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction in crafting a response to cyberattacks.118  Nations’ efforts are 
hampered by the fact that international law recognizes no duty to assist other 
nations in investigating cyberaggression absent an explicit agreement to the 
contrary among the parties.119 
A.  Defining Cyberaggression and Its Impact on Applicable Law 
Cyberattacks often do not closely resemble traditional criminal activity; it 
is often difficult to establish that the conduct at issue is criminal, as opposed 
to an act of war or terrorism.120  In the context of cyberspace, “states generate 
crime and terrorism as well as war, and individuals wage war in addition to 
committing crimes and carrying out acts of terrorism.”121  Cyberattacks 
largely “defy the simple categorization of traditional weaponry currently 
used in international law,”122 making it difficult for nations to apply the 
traditional definitions of crime, terrorism, and warfare as understood under 
existing law.  Traditional classifications of crime, terrorism, and warfare 
break down because “[b]y giving nonstate actors access to a new, diffuse 
kind of power, cyberspace erodes nation-states’ monopolization of the ability 
to wage war and effectively levels the playing field between all actors.”123   
Victimized nations seeking to take action under the current international 
legal framework must first determine the source and nature of a 
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cyberattack.124  In doing so, a nation must equate a cyberattack to either a 
traditional armed attack, or to a criminal act.125  Attributing a physical attack 
perpetrated with traditional weaponry to those responsible involves a two-
prong analysis;126  it is determined whether another nation (as opposed to 
individuals or other non-state groups) was responsible for the attack, and if 
not, the attack is addressed as a criminal matter.127  Historically, the evidence 
indicating that another nation perpetrated a physical attack, thus constituting 
an act of war, was relatively clear.128  An attack involved physical 
destruction that only another nation had the resources to inflict, and soldiers 
wearing the uniform of the aggressor nation carried out the attack.129  The 
circumstances surrounding most cyberattacks rarely produce such clear 
evidence.130  By nature, cyberwarfare “represents a disaggregation of 
combatants. . . . and requires significant geographic dispersal of 
assets. . . . [where] [t]he identity and location of attackers are masked.”131  
Moreover, nations without sophisticated cyberspace capabilities or those 
wishing to further disguise the attack’s source may contract with for-hire 
enterprises across the world that are willing to carry out cyberattacks against 
“ ‘legitimate’ targets.”132  Identifying responsible parties is further 
complicated by the rapid advancement in computer technology, which 
creates an almost continuous learning curve that places law enforcement at 
an extreme disadvantage in their attempts to attribute responsibility for an 
attack.133  The technological challenges cyberspace poses, coupled with the 
problem of anonymity, “exponentially increase[ ] the complexity of the 
cross-jurisdictional investigative challenges.”134  Furthermore, a nation must 
show that a cyberattack qualifies as an “armed attack” in the context of 
internationally accepted rules of warfare in order to respond with force,135 
otherwise nations are forced to rely upon criminal proceedings. 
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B.  Existing International Criminal Law Addressing Cybercrime 
If a nation is unable to attribute a cyberattack to a foreign nation or its 
agents, as was the case with the Estonia attack, the law of war prohibits the 
use of force in response, and the aggrieved nation is left to pursue the 
attackers under criminal law.136  Nations pursuing criminal matters 
internationally must depend on treaties and agreements that operate very 
slowly,137 thwarting efforts to assert jurisdiction over cyberattackers based on 
the concept of territorial jurisdiction.138  Under the theory of territorial 
jurisdiction, the ability of a nation to apply its laws to a given crime is based 
on the physical locations of the origin and target of the attack.139  As the 
recent cyberattack on Georgia demonstrates, while the location of the target 
is readily apparent, cyberspace presents challenges to this notion of 
jurisdiction because the location of the origin is often indeterminate.  Despite 
these challenges, a victimized nation may attempt to prosecute those 
responsible for an attack in accordance with the international agreements 
proscribing criminal cyber activity. 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime140 is the only 
multilateral, legally binding instrument that addresses criminal activity in 
cyberspace.141  The Convention on Cybercrime has five main purposes: “(1) 
harmonization of substantive criminal law on cybercrime; (2) harmonization 
of criminal procedure; (3) facilitating mutual legal assistance; (4) codifying 
international law, with an emphasis on territory-based jurisdictional rules; 
and (5) providing for a legal framework to enable development and 
understanding of the issues related to cybercrime.”142  The Convention aims 
to protect society against cybercrime and focuses on criminal activities such 
as “copyright infringement, computer-related fraud, child pornography, and 
offenses related to breaches of network security.”143  Although the 
Convention identifies specific prohibited conduct, it is left to the parties to 
the Convention to unilaterally determine the elements of prohibited conduct 
and the best method of enforcement adopted in each party’s domestic 
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laws.144  The Convention also does not purport to set out universal standards 
for prosecuting acts of cyberaggression nor does it require a particular 
punishment for a given act.145  Moreover, the Convention does not compel 
signatories to enforce one another’s domestic laws, relying instead on 
international cooperation.146  The practical implications of the Convention’s 
use of domestic law and cooperation enforcement were apparent when the 
creator of the “Lovebug” virus, which caused ten billion dollars (U.S.) of 
damage globally was apprehended.147  Although the perpetrator was 
apprehended, authorities were unable to criminally prosecute him because 
the domestic law of the Philippines, the perpetrator’s domicile, did not 
prohibit his conduct, even though he had violated the law of the victimized 
nations.148  Thus, given the Convention’s relatively few signatories, and the 
fact that the Convention is not recognized as reflecting customary 
international norms,149 a victimized nation attempting to prosecute attackers 
residing in a country that is not party to the Convention will have to rely on 
an independent agreement in order to pursue criminal charges against 
perpetrators located within the nonmember state’s borders.150  The challenge 
presented by the domestic differences across nations regarding scope of 
jurisdiction outside of their borders is exacerbated by the fact that, under the 
Convention, member nations are allowed to exempt their own jurisdictional 
rules from the Convention regime.151  Most importantly, the Convention does 
not recognize universal jurisdiction as a means for prosecuting cybercrime 
cases.152 
Similarly, the Group of 8 (G8),153 which is comprised of eight world-
leading market economies, addressed computer-related crimes in the G8 
Recommendations on Transnational Crime.154  The recommendations call for 
international cooperation in investigating cybercrime, review of substantive 
and procedural domestic law to ensure criminal sanctions are in place, and 
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adoption of the European Council’s Convention on Cybercrime.155  These 
recommendations, however, lack specific implementation guidelines and 
they do not have binding effect. 
The U.N. has been working toward developing a comprehensive approach 
to combating cybercrime as well.156  The U.N. published the United Nations 
Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-Related Crime157 in 
1995, which “examines the law governing cybercrime and the need for 
international cooperation in cybercrime investigations.”158  In 2000, the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/59,159 which called on member 
nations to further develop comprehensive domestic policy regarding 
computer-related crime.160  Although Resolution 55/59 reflects U.N. 
recognition of cybercrime as an issue of import, it offers only broad policy 
recommendations which lack the specificity to further harmonize the 
domestic criminal law of member states.161 
C.  Cyberaggression and the Law of War 
The rules of warfare as applied to cyberwarfare are based on principles of 
law established by the U.N. Charter.162  The law of war has traditionally been 
considered in two separate parts: law governing conflict management before 
war is actually declared, and law governing the use of force once war has 
been declared.163  The former, known as jus ad bellum,164 dictates how and 
by what justification a state may use force to respond to a perceived threat.165  
Jus ad bellum is comprised of “those established ‘conflict management’ 
norms and procedures that dictate when a state may—and may not—
legitimately use force as an instrument of dispute resolution.”166  Prior to 
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World War II, sovereign nations had a legal right to declare war unilaterally 
but were expected to announce their intentions.167  The U.N. Charter was 
ratified following the war and “has redefined and codified ‘contemporary jus 
ad bellum in its entirety’ and has become the starting point for all jus ad 
bellum analyses.”168  Jus ad bellum operates as a set of rules that help states 
determine if “use of force” is a lawful response to a perceived threat or acts 
of aggression perpetrated by another nation.169  The U.N. Charter imposes an 
obligation on the UN Security Council to maintain peace (Article 39), 
prohibits threats and uses of force (Article 2(4)), and provides for the right of 
self-defense (Article 51).170  Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter requires all 
Member States to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”171  In addition to the UN Charter, customary international law 
allowing for the use of self-defense requires that a nation show a necessity 
that is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment 
for deliberation. . . . [and] that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, 
for attacking.”172  In short, a nation’s use of aggressive force is “a crime 
against peace that has been outlawed by the international community,” and is 
only excusable if the force used “is an exercise of [a nation’s] inherent right 
of self-defense,” or if it is authorized by the U.N. Security Council.173 
Under the U.N. Charter, as it pertains to cyberattacks, it is unclear 
whether a cyberattack perpetrated by one nation against another rises to the 
level of a use of force necessary to trigger a nation’s right of self-defense.174  
Moreover, the U.N. Charter’s “use of force” doctrine does not cover the 
actions of terrorists and other non-state actors,175 who are often behind 
cyberattacks.  Since acts of cyberaggression are not amenable to traditional 
classification under internationally accepted rules of warfare, it is generally 
accepted that nations must treat international cyberattacks as a criminal 
matter.176  Thus, even in the event that a nation or its agents perpetrate a 
cyberattack, under the current international legal regime, absent 
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unsanctioned unilateral action, the victimized nation would likely be forced 
to resort to criminal prosecution to obtain justice.  
IV.  AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO STRENGTHENING GLOBAL 
CYBERSECURITY 
A.  International Regimes Combating Maritime Crime and Piracy 
The Internet poses legal challenges similar to those encountered in 
maintaining order in the use of the world’s oceans.  UNCLOS, which 
imposes law and order in the seas, entered into force based on “the notion 
that all problems of ocean space are closely related and needed to be 
addressed as a whole.”177  Similarly, the Internet is shared globally and the 
consequences of actions taken by an Internet user in one jurisdiction can be 
borne globally.  As a result, the legal challenges posed by cyberaggression 
are similar in many respects to the problems posed by piracy and other 
criminal activity on the high seas.  UNCLOS specifically addresses piracy by 
defining conduct that constitutes piracy178 and describing the duties of all 
nations with respect to combating piracy.179  For example, UNCLOS 
balances the territorial jurisdiction of nations with the concept of universal 
jurisdiction.  Article 105 provides that “[o]n the high seas, or in any other 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship 
or aircraft” and that “[t]he courts of the State which carried out the seizure 
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed.”180  Moreover, if a vessel 
engaged in piracy is captured in international waters by a nation that does not 
have criminal law that applies beyond their territorial borders, other nations 
that do have such criminal law may prosecute the pirates based on universal 
jurisdiction.181  
B.  Universal Jurisdiction  
While there has been some debate among state officials and scholars over 
whether the doctrine of universal jurisdiction applies to acts of piracy,182 
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many scholars argue that universal jurisdiction is clearly established as a 
means for prosecuting such acts.183  The history of the international 
community’s treatment of piracy suggests that there is universal jurisdiction 
over acts of piracy.184  In fact, pirates have been prosecuted based on the 
principle of universal jurisdiction as early as the sixteenth century.185  
Although international law generally requires some nexus between the crime 
and the forum of prosecution in order to justify jurisdiction,186 international 
jurisdiction over crimes such as piracy is an exception.187  Such an exception 
exists because “ ‘every state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to 
combat egregious offenses that states universally have condemned,’ ”188 of 
which piracy is one.  Some experts argue that the current legal regime only 
requires nations to prosecute piracy arising in their jurisdiction under their 
own laws189 because crimes constituting piracy have never been prosecuted 
in an international tribunal, and the definition and prosecution of piracy have 
been left to respective national law.190  Despite the fact that an act of piracy 
has never been tried before an international tribunal, prosecutions of piracy 
based on universal jurisdiction are well documented.191  Proponents of 
universal jurisdiction over piracy conferred by international law find support 
for their argument in post-World War II international agreements and the 
opinions of international tribunal judges.192  One expert, Kenneth Randall, 
notes: 
The historic universal jurisdiction over piracy has been used to 
justify universal jurisdiction over modern-day international 
offenses.  Judges in the post-World War II prosecution of war 
criminals, in international tribunals and those organized by 
occupying authorities, relied on universal jurisdiction in their 
opinions.  The precedent of universal jurisdiction over piracy 
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similarly was important to drafting post-War humanitarian 
treaties . . . .193 
Further evidence that universal jurisdiction over piracy exists is found in 
UNCLOS, in which “[t]he concept of universality principle is one of several 
legal concepts by which piracy . . . [is] elevated to the top tier of the 
normative hierarchy of international law.”194  At the very least, universal 
jurisdiction grants nations the right, but not the obligation, to punish pirates 
captured outside of the nation’s territorial waters.195   
Given such evidence that universal jurisdiction exists, Professor Dubner 
notes, “The problem is not that jurisdiction is unattainable, but rather that no 
country is exercising jurisdiction.”196  A recent study of maritime incidents 
occurring between 1998 and 2009 identified 1,158 incidents of piracy 
cognizable under universal jurisdiction.197  Nonetheless, international 
prosecution occurred in only 1.47% of cases.198  An explanation offered for 
the low prosecution rate is the naval and judicial costs of prosecution to the 
capturing nation where the incident itself did not affect that nation directly.199  
Developing nations tend to incur lower prosecution costs than developed 
nations, which helps explain why pirates are often transferred to countries 
like Kenya for prosecution, even when victimized ship has the same country 
of origin as the capturing ship.200  Despite its infrequent use, some experts 
believe that universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy is “a prototype to which 
should be assimilated in time all crimes universally recognized as offenses 
against society.”201  The fact that nations are permitted to prosecute acts of 
piracy under the principle of universal jurisdiction, but often choose not to, 
does not undermine its application to cyberaggression.  
Acts of cyberaggression, like piracy, are carried out in an environment 
where jurisdiction is unclear.  A legal framework conferring universal 
jurisdiction over some acts of cyberaggression may help to resolve some of 
the jurisdictional issues raised by attacks such as the one on Estonia.  
Universal jurisdiction could be extended to cybercrime if the international 
community recognizes cybercrime as a universally condemned egregious 
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offense.202  Thus, a comprehensive, universally accepted definition of the 
spectrum of cybercrime would facilitate application of universal jurisdiction.     
Like piracy,203 however, it is difficult to define cybercrime because it is 
often unclear whether the perpetrators are affiliated with or sponsored by 
sovereign nations or criminal organizations.204  Universal jurisdiction 
necessitates international agreement on the nature of illegal cyberactivity that 
separates criminal cyberactivity from cyberwarfare.  The inadequacy of 
UNCLOS’s definition of piracy is a notable shortcoming of the 
convention,205 and is instructive on the importance of a carefully constructed 
international definition of cybercrime.  A comprehensive definition of 
cybercrime would require intense international cooperation, given the 
burgeoning cyberwarfare operations pursued by many nations, including 
several world powers.206  One legal scholar, Susan Brenner, has developed a 
plausible method for distinguishing between various types of cybercrimes.207  
Brenner separates cyberaggression into three categories: cybercrime, 
cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare.208  Dividing cybercrime into manageable 
components could facilitate the development of international law governing 
the rights and duties of nations with respect to each category of activity.  
This approach would help to address the shortcomings of present 
international cybersecurity law, and is in line with an ongoing shift toward “a 
model of indirect state responsibility” in international law.209  Cybercrime is 
an international problem with international consequences, and an effective 
response demands its recognition as a category of offenses that are 
universally condemned. 
C.  The Prospect of a U.N. Agency Regulating Cybersecurity  
If members of the international community were able to develop a 
convention structured after UNCLOS, mandating international cooperation 
on cybersecurity and applying universal jurisdiction to acts of 
cyberaggression, the benefits would be palpable.  One such benefit would be 
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an opportunity to create a U.N. agency comparable to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO)210 whose purpose would be to ensure the 
safety and security of the Internet.  
The IMO was created pursuant to the adoption of the Convention on the 
International Maritime Organization,211 which entered into force in 1958.  
The purpose of the IMO as stated in Article 1(a) of the Convention is to 
facilitate cooperation among governments in order to ensure that the “highest 
practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety” are in place.212  
The IMO also maintains detailed records of all incidents of piracy,213 which 
supports the IMO’s policy recommendations and efforts to develop new law 
when the need arises.214  One such legal instrument is Resolution A.738(18), 
which was intended to facilitate States’ duties to cooperate in the repression 
of piracy under Article 100 of UNCLOS.215  Generally, Resolution 
A.738(18) encouraged intergovernmental cooperation in all aspects of piracy 
prevention and solidified the IMO’s antipiracy strategy.  The IMO’s 
“strategy consist[s] of compilation and distribution of periodical statistical 
reports, piracy seminars and field assessment missions to regions affected by 
piracy and the preparation of a code of practice for the investigation and 
prosecution of the crime of piracy.”216 
An agency similar in function to the IMO dedicated to tracking incidents 
of cyberaggression and fostering cooperation between member nations 
would help to consolidate the international effort to monitor and deter 
cyberaggression.  Moreover, such an agency would help to legitimize the 
international legal regime that created it, and would provide sound policy 
rooted in empirical evidence. 
D.  The Prospect of an International Cybercrime Tribunal 
Although international maritime law has not established an international 
tribunal to prosecute acts of piracy, some experts believe that creating such a 
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tribunal would provide a long-term solution to combating piracy.217  
Employing an international tribunal with respect to acts of cyberaggression 
would ensure that offenses are not treated differently across jurisdictional 
lines.  At the very least, the existence of an international tribunal with 
universal jurisdiction over acts of cyberaggression would deter such acts and 
provide a venue for prosecution where nations otherwise often refuse to 
prosecute such acts.  As with piracy, it may be difficult to compel nations to 
prosecute acts of cyberaggression in the absence of an international tribunal, 
where the concept of universal jurisdiction confers a right but does not 
impose an obligation to prosecute such crimes.218  It has been suggested that 
“while every state should retain the right to redress piracy, the United 
Nations could create an ad hoc tribunal to have the obligation to redress 
piracy.”219  As has been suggested for handling the prosecution of piracy 
under UNCLOS, an international agreement addressing acts of 
cyberaggression could allow nations to retain the right to redress cybercrime, 
while creating an international tribunal that has an obligation to prosecute 
cybercrime.  This type of tribunal would help to preserve national autonomy, 
while providing nations and private actors with an international forum for 
redressing their grievances.  Since cybercrime, like piracy, has a large impact 
on private actors who are often the victims of these types of crimes, allowing 
private actors to pursue justice via access to an international tribunal would 
encourage nations to bring domestic policies in line with international 
standards.220  The availability of an international cybercrime tribunal could 
also lessen nationalistic resistance to international standards by empowering 
private actors with the ability to seek international redress for economic 
injury inflicted by acts of cybercrime. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current international legal regime governing cybersecurity fails to 
provide a comprehensive, effective framework for dealing with the 
unprecedented challenges posed by the various forms of cyberaggression.  
However, the international legal framework governing piracy, even with its 
shortcomings, provides a basis for an analogous regime governing 
international cybersecurity.   
The recent cyberattacks on Estonia, Georgia, and Iran demonstrate the 
shortcomings of both international criminal law governing cybercrime and 
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the absence of international law addressing cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.  
In a world where internet commerce is increasingly important to the growth 
of the global economy, nations cannot afford to shape cybersecurity law 
unilaterally in furtherance of provincial interests at the expense of a 
concerted international effort to develop uniform cybersecurity law.  As the 
economic futures of nations become ever more intertwined, international 
consensus on issues like cyberaggression is essential to global security and 
economic well-being. 
Analogizing cyberthreats to the concerns that spawned cooperation in 
developing international maritime law is a useful starting point for analyzing 
and developing an international response that is necessary to meaningfully 
address global cybersecurity.  Without an international agreement that 
defines the spectrum of cyberaggression, provides for some form of universal 
jurisdiction over perpetrators, and establishes an international organization 
focused on cybersecurity policy, the threat to international security posed by 
cyberaggression will continue to grow.  To that end, the mere existence of an 
international cybercrime tribunal would go a long way toward encouraging 
cooperation on the development of international norms relating to 
cybercrime, while allowing nations to retain some level of autonomy in the 
development and enforcement of domestic cybersecurity policy. 
